The spread of ever more sophisticated weaponry-including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons-and of the missiles capable of carrying them represents a growing danger to international security. This proliferation exacerbates and fuels regional tensions and complicates U.S. defense planning. It poses ever greater dangers to U.S. forces and facilities abroad, and possibly even to the United States itself/ George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, March 1990 We are threatened by the continued proliferation of advanced conventional arms, ballistic missiles of increasing range, and weapons of mass destruction . .. . 2 Inevitably, an increasing number of supplier nations will become able to contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction.3
As the Patriot demonstrated during the Gulf War, ballistic missile defenses are crucial to protect our troops and allies against madmen or rogue nations.4
George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1993
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction represents a major challenge to our security. 5 Weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, biological, and chemical-along with the missiles that deliver them, pose a major threat to our security . ... 6 
INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf War confirmed the utility of using tactical ballistic missiles as a political terror weapon. Iraq's launching of Scud missiles against Tel Aviv on 18 January 1991 threatened to draw Israel into the war and forced the United States to respond by rushing Patriot air defense systems to the region to protect key Israeli population centers.
While the political and strategic significance of the 88 tactical ballistic missiles7 Iraq launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia during the war appears obvious, the tactical effect of these missiles on the battlefield is less apparent.8
Despite growing evidence of technological advances in guidance and warhead sys tems that warrant concern, much of the current literature ignores the operational and While the extreme physical devastation and psychological dislocation resulting from the use of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction will have far-reaching politi cal and strategic effects, their impact on tactical military operations will also be signifi cant. Thus, this monograph breaks new ground and demonstrates why military leaders and planners should pay more attention to the emerging tactical threat from ballistic mis siles, unconventional warheads, and weapons of mass destruction.
Changes in the nation's military strategy, the continued global proliferation of ballis tic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and the pace of technological improve ments to these systems mandate that commanders and planners understand the military significance of ballistic missiles on the tactical battlefield. With the end of the Cold War, the nation's shift from a strategy of forward presence to an increased reliance on force projection operations means that the armed forces will deploy to unstable areas of the world where host nation defense forces may be limited and force protection will be an immediate priority. Within that environment, the proliferation of tactical ballistic missiles among Third World nations combined with the predilection of some leaders to use them against U.S. forces-Libya in 1986 and Iraq in 1991 -provides both the means and precedent for a TBM attack on U.S. forces in the future. While current missile accuracy may limit the effectiveness of a conventionally armed tactical ballistic missile as a point weapon, the addition of a chemical, biological or nuclear warhead makes the TBM militarily significant regardless of circular error probable (CEP).10
The improvements in missile accuracy and range that have occurred over the last twenty years will continue, making both conventionally and unconventionally armed missiles an ever-increasing threat to tactical forces. Finally, attempts at counterproliferation may slow but will not stop the emergence of these evolving weapon systems in the arsenals of developing countries. Several developing nations, including some that are hostile to the United States, possess indigenous missile and warhead programs that render them rela tively impervious to American or international arms control and counterproliferation ef forts. As the following chart demonstrates, some missile-producing nations, irrespective of their relationship with the United States, also have export agreements or development partnerships with nations that are either hostile to the United States or embroiled in re gional disputes that may involve U.S. forces at some point in the future.11 
TRANSFERS OF MISSILES AND RELATED TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

CRITICAL CONCEPTS
The discussion of ballistic missile development and current threat environment set the conditions for an informed examination of the effect of these weapons on tactical military operations. Therefore, it is important to define the three concepts -primary effect, secondary effect and tactical battle space-that form the boundaries of this mono graph.
Primary effects are those that occur directly from a missile attack or from the threat of such an attack. In the Persian Gulf War, tactical commanders planned for Scud attacks on their units as they entered the theater, trained in assembly areas, passed through the breach, conducted decisive combat operations, and even as they signed the armistice at Safwan While most sources acknowledge the political, strategic and even operational impact of ballistic missiles, the focus of this monograph is on the effect of these weapons on the tactical commander's battle space. Battle space, as defined by the U.S. Army's keystone waJii ghting doctrine, Field Manual l00-5, Operations, is a physical, three-dimensional volume that extends to the maximum capabilities of the commander to acquire and en gage the enemy. In examining the impact of ballistic missiles on the tactical commander's battle space, the type, quantity and capability of the assets at the tactical commander's disposal delimit the area concerned. At the tactical level of war, "corps and divisions fight ... battles and engagements." Thus, for the purpose of analysis, this monograph places the upper limit of tactical battle space at the area defined by the capabilities of the assets organic to an Army corps; the lower limit extends down to the area associated with a maneuver company. 1 5
THE HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT AND CURRENT STATUS OF BALLISTIC MISSILES
In light of the recent use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, a mythology has arisen concerning TBMs. Some of the erroneous perceptions include the beliefs that all missiles are alike; that the Persian Gulf War was the first time ballistic missiles had been used in combat; that they are extremely inaccurate and only good for terrorizing urban populations; and that they are militarily insignificant weapons. 1 6 An in-depth analysis of the history, development and use of ballistic missiles dispels these misconceptions and highlights their potential impact on the tactical commander's battle space.
Ballistic and Cruise Missiles
Largely due to the intense publicity the use of the Scud missile received during the Persian Gulf War, "Scud" has become, incorrectly, the nom de guerre for the several models of surface-to-surface missiles present in the world today. In reality, there are two types of surface-to-surface missiles-ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. A ballistic missile is an unmanned, rocket -powered weapon. It receives power from its engines and guidance from the guidance system only in the ascent. In the descent, it follows a ballistic (unpowered and unguided) trajectory. The majority of ballistic missiles are exoatmospheric.
Conversely, a cruise missile is an unmanned aircraft propelled by an air-breathing engine similar to those used in airplanes. Most modern versions employ inertial guidance systems as well as terrain comparison programs that link television or infrared images of the terrain to computer-generated images of the planned attack route to achieve pinpoint accuracy. Like an aircraft, the cruise missile is endoatmospheric. Unlike most aircraft, however, the cruise missile provides an extremely small radar cross section and is there fore more difficult for air defense systems to detect and engage. 1 7
Early Ballistic Missile History
Although the use of rockets and missiles in war extends back to Tamer lane's Battle of Delhi in 1399, the slow pace of technical advancement resulted in only sporadic employ ment of these weapons in the ensuing centuries. A brief flurry of interest reemerged around 1800 with the adaptation of an Indian rocket by Sir William Congreve for use by the British Army. In 1806, after setting the town of Boulogne, France afire with his rockets, Congreve proclaimed that "the rocket is, in truth, an arm by which the whole system of military tactics is destined to be changed." Yet despite Congreve's prophetic comment, the useful development of rockets and missiles as weapons of war had to wait until the twentieth century. 1 8
Modern surface-to-surface missiles first saw wartime service with the firing of V -1 and V-2 weapons against London, Paris, Antwerp, Liege and Brussels during the latter stages of World War II. The V -1 "flying bomb" was a small cruise missile powered by a pulse jet that "buzzed" as it flew. It traveled at speeds up to four hundred miles per hour at altitudes between 3,000 and 5,000 feet and carried a ton of explosive. Early models ranged out to 250 kilometers. Later in 1945, the Germans boosted the range to 400 kilometers by replacing certain portions of the airframe with plywood and reducing the size of the warhead. In a final effort to increase the range of the missile, the Germans slung the V -1 under a Heinkel-11 1 airplane, creating the first air-launched cruise missile. The combined range of the aircraft and missile extended to nearly 1,300 kilometers. Its rudimentary guidance system kept the V -1 accurate to within 10 kilometers for every 160 kilometers of flight. Although quite inaccurate by modern standards, the V -1 was accu rate enough to strike large urban areas such as Greater London. 1 9
The V -2 was a single-stage, liquid-fueled ballistic missile equipped with an inertial guidance system. It weighed almost 13 tons, carried a one-ton warhead, and had a range of 350 kilometers. Powered by nearly nine tons of alcohol and liquid oxygen and con trolled by gyroscopes or radio signals that moved large graphite vanes located behind the jet, the missile rose vertically for six miles before automatic controls turned it to 45 de grees for its final climb. Once it attained a speed sufficient to reach its intended range, the engine shut off and the missile flew in a "gigantic parabola" to the target. At its apex, the missile climbed to a height of fifty miles. Its peak speed was 4,000 miles per hour; it made the flight from Germany or the Netherlands to London in three or four minutes. 2 0
In the last year of the war, the Germans successfully launched 19,395 V-1 cruise missiles and 2,952 V -2 ballistic missiles at cities in England and on the Continent. While
Hitler's Verge/tung or "retaliation" campaign had little or no strategic effect on the Allied war effort, it did inflict immense physical damage, killing over 13,000 civilians and sol diers and seriously wounding at least another 25,000. More importantly, the V -weapons had an immense psychological impact on the populace. Of these missiles, Winston Churchill wrote
[they] imposed upon the people of London a burden perhaps even heavier than the air-raids of 1940 and 1941. Suspense and strain were more prolonged. Dawn brought no relief, and cloud no comfort .... The blind impersonal nature of the missile made the individual on the ground feel helpless. There was little that he could do, no human enemy that he could see shot down. 21 Interestingly, although both missiles carried the same size warhead, the V -2 caused nearly twice as many casualties as the V -1. The slower speed of the V -1 permitted Allied planes and antiaircraft artillery to intercept it occasionally, while its engine noise served to warn people to take cover. Conversely, the V-2's supersonic speed guaranteed the pen etration of Allied air space, while its lack of engine noise made the missile's impact a surprise, preventing any manner of early warning or protective action. 2 2
Recent Ballistic Missile Development
Despite losing World War II, the Germans continued to influence missile develop ment during the early stages of the Cold War. After the war, both the United States and the Soviet Union used captured V -weapons (and German scientists) in the early phases of their missile programs. Of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union, through its export of missiles to developing nations, did more to propagate the German ballistic missile legacy. 23
Of the several potential Soviet missile systems available for export, the SS-1 C or Scud B missile (NATO designation) has become the sine qua non of developing ballistic missile programs. It is not without reason that the Scud missile has entered the lexicon of military planners and defense analysts as a synonym for tactical ballistic missile. The Soviet Scud B is the most widely proliferated surface-to-surface missile in the world today. As of early 1993, there were 22 countries with Scud B missiles in their arsena1s. 2 4
Drawing heavily on the original V-2 design, the Soviet Union developed and mass produced the Scud B in the 1960s for deployment with Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. In response to requests from the then client states of Syria, Libya and Egypt, the Soviets developed a special export version (designated R-17E), the first of which reached Egypt in 1973 and was used in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The export version had a throw weight of one metric ton (1 ,000 kg or 2,200 lb) and a range of approximately 300 kilome ters, and came with the same eight-wheeled, high-mobility transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) used by the Soviets. Its circular error probable (CEP) ranged between 400 and 1,000 meters. The more difficult of the two approaches taken by North Korea to increase the range of the modified Scud B missile involved a complete redesign of the missile system based on "Scud" technology. This resulted in the manufacture of the Nodong 1 and 2 missiles. The estimated range of the Scud Mod D or Nodong 1 missile is between 1,000 and 1,300 kilometers, a distance that includes all of the Korean peninsula, Kyoto and Osaka in Japan, Beijing and Shanghai, and parts of Russia. The North Koreans had trouble with the accuracy of the Nodong 1 missile and may limit deployment until the Nodong 2 or Scud Mod E missile is available. Reports estimate that the Nodong 2 will have a range between 1,500 and 2,000 kilometers. Unlike the Nodong 1 and its predecessors, the Nodong 2 is either a multistage or clustered missile. North Korea's inexperience with these types of missiles may delay fielding of the Nodong 2.29
China has followed the example set by the Soviet Union and North Korea in missile development and export sales. The Chinese have greatly expanded their ballistic missile production since their initial foray in the 1960s. Like the North Koreans, the Chinese have pursued two lines of missile production. The CSS/Dongfeng line of strategic nuclear missiles, designed for use by the People's Liberation Army, expanded from the CSS-1 deployed in 1967 to include the CSS-2, CSS-3 and CSS-4 (known in China as the DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5). The CSS-2 (DF-3) has a range of 3,000 kilometers and a CEP of 1,000 meters. The Chinese sold a conventional version with a range of 2,700 kilometers to Saudi Arabia in 1987. The CSS-3 (DF-4) and CSS-4 (DF-5) missiles are two-stage, liquid-fueled missiles with ranges of 7,000 kilometers and 10,000 kilometers respec tively.30
In 1984, the Chinese began a second line of missile production aimed primarily at the Third World export market. The rapid proliferation of ballistic missiles among developing countries over the last decade has spawned a debate about their actual ability to affect the conduct of tactical operations. The issue centers on whether ballistic missiles or combat aircraft represent a more effi cient means for developing nations to exercise military power. At first glance, aircraft appear more advantageous. They are reusable, more versatile, and capable of achieving better accuracy than their single-shot ballistic brethren. Ballistic missiles, how ever, confer prestige and enhance deterrence, two benefits that combat aircraft do not necessarily provide. 35 More importantly, for Third Wo rld nations engaged in combat against the United States, ballistic missiles may be the only viable means to attack U.S. troops . The power of U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft and Army air defenses to deter or destroy any potential air attack denies an enemy the luxury of adopting any other course of action.
In the Persian Gulf War, the most recent conflict between a Third World air force and U.S. armed forces, no enemy aircraft overflew United States or coalition forces. The United States and her allies had air supremacy then and are likely to continue to have it in any conflict in the foreseeable future. This would seem to drive the virtual attrition rate of Third World aircraft facing a U.S.-led deployment to well above 50 percent, the maximun crossover point many analysts believe neccessary to make ballistic missiles more cost effective than aircraft. Thus, the likelihood that an adversary would test his air force against that of the United States is small. Instead, given such attrition, a third world adversary planning an attack on U.S. forces would probably find it more cost-effective to launch ballistic missiles than to employ combat aircraft. 3 6
While this may seem extreme, it was essentially Iraq's strategy during the Persian Gulf War. The Iraqis understood that the speed of their missiles gave them a chance at penetrating coalition air space, something their air force could never do. At the very least, given the conti i med asymmetry between U.S. and Third World air forces, it is reasonable to expect a potential adversary to employ a mixture of missiles and aircraft-maybe more missiles than aircraft -against deploying U.S. forces. This expectation, combined with the likelihood that any future foe will have improved the accuracy and yield of his ballistic missiles, poses an ever-increasing threat to deploying tactical forces.
Third World Missile Status
The ballistic missile threat to U.S. tactical forces is real and quantifiable. Ta ble 2 outlines this threat by nation and type of missile. All references to range, payload and CEP are approximate and based on unclassified information.37 While this threat informa tion is as comprehensive as possible, limited access to a number of countries on the list prevents a complete and exact indexing of ballistic m issile capabilities. Moreover, for reasons of deterrence, most nations may prefer to leave others guessing as to the actual extent of their capabilities. Nonetheless, this index highlights several trends in the emerging missile threat to U.S. forces.
The most obvious trend is the spread of Scud and Scud-derivative missiles through out the Third World. This is attributable to the proliferation begun by the Soviet Union and carried on since its collapse by such nations as Iraq and North Korea. Of particular note is the emergence of Chinese missiles in several developing countries. This indicates how effective the Chinese have become in marketing their more modem "M" series mis siles and may demonstrate the viable limits of Scud-derivative proliferation.
Another notable characteristic concerns the range of most missiles. The majority of ballistic missiles have ranges under 1,000 kilometers. When equipped with improved guidance systems and warheads, these missiles will possess the range, accuracy and lethality to pose a militarily significant threat to tactical units. Similarly, the majority of missile payloads can carry over 1,100 pounds. This is the minimum weight believed 
Deployment and Early Entry
United States forces are most vulnerable during the deployment and early entry phase of feree projection operations. An enemy may be unwilling or unable to employ ground or air forces against deploying units, but can attack ports of debarkation with ballistic missiles from secure locations hundreds of kilometers away from the entry area. During this phase, an enemy will attempt to prevent or delay U.S. forces from entering the theater by using his ballistic missiles to attack ports, airfields and logistics bases.39
The primary effect of such an attack would be to close the airfield or port at least temporarily while surviving personnel treated casualties and removed debris. If the en emy employs submunitions in his attack, there is the likelihood of increased damage to arriving aircraft, resulting in additional casualties and debris. In the case of a chemical attack on an airfield, the number of casualties would increase, while the damage to facili-ties would decrease. Moreover, the presence of a chemical agent would limit flight operations and slow the inprocessing of newly arriving combat forces. In a scenario where the commander needs to transition forces rapidly from arrival in theater to combat operations, such an attack risks disrupting the flow of troops, upsetting the commander's tempo of operations and potentially invalidating his plan. If the attack occurred on a tactical airfield, the damage to aircraft would reduce the available sorties and disrupt the tempo of air operations. The loss of tactical aircraft would impact on the ability of the commander to attack enemy ground troops , interdict their supply lines, hunt for ballistic missile launchers, and protect his air space. The loss, through either missile attack or intimidation, of an intermediate staging base or the forward portion of a communications zone located in an allied nation would de grade significantly the commander's ability to bring forces and supplies into theater and execute his war plan. One nation particularly vital to U.S. military deployments in Asia is Japan. An attacking North Korean force, however, could range the coast of Japan with Scud Mod C missiles from positions just south of Seoul, South Korea. Even worse, using the Nodong 1 missile (1,000-1,300 kilometer range), the North Koreans can reach Osaka and To kyo from locations outside their capital of Pyongyang. While it is unlikely that the Japanese would prevent U.S. forces from staging out of Japan, improvements in North Korea's missile program and the potential for such an attack compelled the Japa nese to purchase the Patriot missile system from the United States. Concern over assured access to bases in Japan obliged the United States to agree to sell the Patriot missile system -a system based on highly advanced computer and aerospace technology-to Japan, a competitor in the global computer and aerospace industry. Moreover, in the event of war, the political pressure to destroy mobile launchers and alleviate the threat of missile attacks on Japan will force a diversion of aircraft and intelligence assets in a situation reminiscent of the Persian Gulf War. Compared to the relatively flat sands of Iraq, however, the mountainous terrain in Korea will make it even more difficult to find the launchers. This difficulty will cause an even greater diversion of air assets away from attacking ground formations than occurred during the "Great Scud Hunt" in the Persian Gulf War. Given the remote nature of the Korean theater of operations and the expected rapidity of a North Korean attack, any diversion of assets away from stopping a North Korean offensive could prolong the conflict, lead to increased casualties, and limit the ability of tactical commanders to achieve victory on the battlefieldY
Buildup and Expansion
During the buildup and expansion phase of force projection operations, an enemy will continue to attempt to disrupt the deployment of forces into the theater with missile attacks on ports, airfields, logistics bases and tactical assembly areas. To deter, or if necessary defeat, such an attack by North Korea, General Gary Luck, the commander of Lieutenant General Paul Funk, commander of the U.S. Army's III Corps, confirmed this danger with respect to his unit's potential deployment to South Korea to thwart a future North Korean attack. He commented that given the restricted nature of the terrain in Korea, a ballistic missile attack had more potential lethality than one might face in Saudi Arabia. He emphasized that the lack of room in Korea to disperse his maneuver forces and logistics sites left them at risk.45 Depending on the type of warhead employed, a successful missile attack in this situation could cause heavy casualties, destroy or con taminate countless supplies, and render scores of soft-skinned vehicles inoperable.
During this phase, a missile attack on po l itical, strategic or operational targets poses significant secondary effects for tactical forces. The loss of an intermediate staging base for soldiers and supplies would limit the commander's ability to execute his tactical plan. The objective of the commander during combat operations is to achieve a quick, decisive victory with minimal casualties. A successful ballistic missile attack during this phase can prevent the commander from achieving his goal. During decisive operations, when combat forces are moving and fighting, the enemy will use his ballistic missiles to interdict the fri endly movement of troops and supplies and attack fri endly forces as they congregate to pass through choke points on the battlefield. Moreover, in at least one battalion, staff offi cers and headquarters personnel follow ing the combat forces through the area stopped and dismounted their vehicles to survey the situation. As they gathered together, a senior noncommissioned officer commented that they were all vulnerable to an attack by indirect fire. If that fire had been from ballistic missiles armed with fu el-air explosives, the battalion staff would have been killed and all of the light-skinned vehicles -command and control shelters, supply vehicles and fuel tankers -destroyed. Such an attack would have decapitated the battalion, removing most of the unit's planning personnel. Additionally, the loss of vehicles, par ticularly fuel vehicles, would have forced that battalion to run out of fuel. While the 1st Infantry Division had spare combat vehicles to replace destroyed tanks and infantry fight ing vehicles, it did not have any additional fuel tankers. Thus, while there may have been enough bulk fuel within the 1st Division and VII Corps, the inability to distribute that fuel to front-line units risked disrupting the division and corps battle plans. 51 In certain situations, the political or strategic use of ballistic missiles by the enemy may also have the secondary tactical effect of inhibiting the movement of reinforcements and supplies to critical points on the battlefield. Consider the case of a war in Korea, where political considerations will force the Combined Forces Command (CFC) to de fend the approaches to Seoul. To do so, the CFC may need to move forces and supplies in and around Seoul. A North Korean missile attack on Seoul, regardless of whether it carried chemical munitions, would affect the populace psychologically to the point where the ensuing mass exodus of refugees would clog the vital road networks needed by the military forces. This phenonenon was evident in Teheran during the Iran-Iraq War and in Tel Aviv throughout Operation Desert Storm. Seoul is the fourth most populous city in the world with a projected population of almost 22 million people by the year 2000 . It has a population density of 49, 101 people per square mile -five times that of Tel Av iv. If North Korea lived up to the pledge one of its diplomats made in April 1994, to tum Seoul "into a sea of fire," the consequent exodus could easily overcome efforts by Korean authorities to control it. Furthermore, if the North Koreans used chemical munitions on Seoul, the immense congestion in the city portends massive casualties, potentially draw ing Uni ted States and South Korean medical and logistical personnel and supplies away from the front to provide disaster rel ief. 52
Redeployment and Postconflict
Although most significant combat activities will have ceased as U.S. forces transition into the redeployment and postconflict phase of force projection operations, an enemy may still launch a "last ditch" missile attack against U.S. fo rces. In this event, an enemy would target large facilities and collections of soldiers such as ports, airfields and assem bly areas. The impact of a ballistic missile attack during this phase would have a debili tating psychological as well as physical effect on tactical fo rces. While the congestion of departing forces suggests the potential for higher casualties, the shock of such an attack might far outweigh the physical effects of the bombardment. A successful ballistic mis sile attack on a victorious army may call into question the concept of victory, undermine the political rationale for initially deploying fo rces, and put future deployments at risk. An attack with weapons of mass destruction could damage or contaminate port and air field faci lities, delaying or preventing the redeployment of U.S. forces. Given that the national military strategy envisions fighting two nearly simultaneous major regional con tingencies, the inability to redeploy forces from one theater to another rapidly could jeop ardize the chances for tactical, operational and strategic success in the second major regional contingency.
CONCLUSION
Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction represent a credible tactical threat to U.S. forces engaged in force projection operations. The proliferation of improved missile guidance, propulsion and warhead technologies among Third World nations will only serve to increase the lethality of this threat to U.S. forces in the future. As nations improve the quality and quantity of their missile arsenals, missiles will assume ever increasing utility over combat aircraft. In a conflict with the United States, the power of the U.S. Air Force and Navy to ground any enemy air force will reinforce this belief, tempting an adversary to use his ballistic missile arsenal to best advantage. Moreover, after a slow but continuous expansion of the use of ballistic missiles in combat, the prece dent for an attack on U.S. forces has been set. The Libyan attacks in 1986 represented a meager but determined attempt to strike back at the United States for its air raids earlier that year. The attacks by Iraq during the Persian Gulf War, however, opened the door for similar large-scale attacks in the future. The expected advancements in missile and war head technology will permit foes to strike at U.S. forces from longer distances with greater accuracy and lethality. If successful, these attacks will have a militarily significant effect on the conduct of the deployment and early entry, buildup and expansion, decisive opera tions, and redeployment and postconflict phases of force projection operations.
Tactical commanders from battalion to corps must understand and appreciate the devastating effect of attacks by ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction on their battle space. These attacks could delay or prevent the entry of forces into the theater of operations, slow the movement of soldiers and equipment from ports and airfields, disrupt the timing and synchronization of decisive operations, necessitate the diversion of essential resources, and cause innumerable casualties. A successful ballistic missile at tack could invalidate the concept of"decisive victory with minimal casualties" and under mine the potential for success in future force projection operations. Therefore, com manders must incorporate the threat from ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruc-: tion into their tactical plans or suffer the attendant consequences.
8.
Ballistic missile attack and defense is a relatively new field of study. It was an outgrowth of the study of nuclear theory, emerging in the mid-1980s with a focus on NATO and the Warsaw Pact. As the United States and the Soviet Union began eliminating entire classes of nuclear weapons, defense analysts started to study the effects of short-range, conventional ballistic missiles on the battlefield. With the end of the Cold War and evidence of missile proliferation in the Third World, study has turned to ballistic missile production and use by developing countries.
The use of ballistic missiles in both the Iran-Iraq War and the more recent Persian
Gulf War reinforced this trend. Currently, this field of study is dominated by de fense analysts and think tank employees who focus primarily at the political and strategic level of war. As an adj unct to the field of ballistic missile study, there has emerged a parallel concern over the use of weapons of mass destruction. The two issues are normally addressed together in the same publications. Some of the major works are: Janne E. Nolan, 10. Circular error probable or circle of equal probability (CEP) is the distance from the intended target in which 50 percent of the missiles will probably land.
11.
In the last ten years, several nations have established missile partnerships. With respect to tactical ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, China's arms exports go beyond merely selling surface-to-surface missiles. In 1989, they 
35.
While the issues of prestige and deterrence are outside the scope of this mono graph, they nonetheless form part of the motivation for developing nations to ac quire ballistic missiles. As a symbol of a nation's military might and technical prowess, ballistic missiles enhance national prestige and stature among other de veloping nations. In a certain sense, the possession of ballistic missiles replicates the political prestige associated with the possession of battleships earlier in the 20th century. In that regard, the concept of actual military utility may in fact give way to the perception of the same. Moreover, actual usefulness may yield to the need of some developing countries to demonstrate an industrial strength and where withal equal to that of developed nations. Brazil and South Africa are two ex amples of nations where the possession of ballistic missiles holds only limited military utility yet provides a symbol of strength and technical capability. Addi tionally, the ability to manufacture missiles and other military hardware magnifies the symbolic value attributed to possession. Indigenous manufacturing not only showcases a nation's technical sophistication, but it also highlights that country's military self-sufficiency and apparent independence from fo reign political influ ence. For a further explanation of these and other benefits of ballistic missile ownership and indigenous production, see Andrew W. 
